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436 
Admissions: What They Are 
and How They Can Impact 
Litigation 
 
Hon. William J. Giacomo* 
 
I. What is an admission? 
 
Many people associate an admission with a confession of guilt 
given in court through testimony. However, in reality an admission 
relates to any material fact and can occur at any time during litigation in 
virtually any form. What is most ironic is that admissions are usually not 
made by the parties themselves but are made inadvertently through their 
attorneys via pleadings, briefs, or statements in open court. 
In fact, since everything said or submitted to court is on some level 
an admission, an attorney must know what he or she is admitting and 
how it may affect his or her case. This Article will examine two cases 
that present common situations during litigation where an admission may 
occur. In doing so, it will examine the background of admissions under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the various modes in which admissions 
are presented, and whether the effect of an admission in the litigation is 
formal (binding) or informal (rebuttable). Armed with that information, 
this Article will then suggest answers to the questions posed in the 
following two case studies. 
 
A. Case Study #1 
 
The facts are as follows: A government agency (“Agency”) was 
charged with monitoring the security and well-being of two young 
children placed under its care. The two children subsequently died in a 
tragic home accident. Following the accident, the children’s next of kin 
 
 *   Honorable William J. Giacomo (B.S. Boston College, J.D. Pace University School 
of Law) is a Justice of the Supreme Court, 9th Judicial District. He is also an Adjunct 
Professor of Law in N.Y. Practice and Contracts at Pace University. The Author 
acknowledges the research and editing assistance of Michael Crowe a third year law 
student at Pace University School of Law. 
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filed suit against the Agency accusing it of negligence in performance of 
its duties. The Agency answered and asserted, among other things, the 
defense of immunity under the New York Social Services Law.
1
 An 
internal investigation of the events leading up to the accident resulted in 
a finding of negligence on the part of the Agency and one of its 
employees. In a motion for summary judgment, counsel for the Agency 
cited the investigation conducted by the Agency and its finding that an 
employee of the Agency was negligent. It claimed that immunity should 
be granted because the finding of negligence failed to meet the statutory 
threshold of “gross” negligence required to deny it immunity under the 
statute. This motion was denied by the trial court, which found that 
issues of fact existed as to whether or not the Agency was “grossly” 
negligent. 
Prior to trial, the next of kin argued that, by citing the results of the 
Agency’s investigation and its finding of negligence on the part of the 
Agency in counsel’s brief for summary judgment, the Agency admitted it 
was negligent in this case. The Agency disagreed. It argued that the brief 
did not constitute an admission of negligence and, since the motion was 
denied, they could still contest negligence at trial. Accordingly, the issue 
is whether the results of the investigation or reference to it in counsel’s 
brief can be considered an admission and, if so, whether the Agency is 
bound to that admission at trial. 
 
B. Case Study #2 
 
The facts of case two are as follows: The case stems from an alleged 
assault and battery of a customer by an individual working at a 
restaurant. The restaurant was incorporated. One of the plaintiff’s causes 
of action against the restaurant in a civil lawsuit was negligent hiring and 
retention of an employee based upon the previous criminal history of the 
accused assailant. Paragraph 17 of plaintiff’s complaint stated 
unequivocally that the accused assailant was an employee of the 
restaurant, a claim that was neither admitted nor denied in the 
defendant’s answer. The evidence showed that the accused assailant was 
a 50 percent shareholder in the restaurant, was solely responsible for its 
day to day operations, and received not only a salary but also quarterly 
draws from the corporation’s profits. At the time of trial, the defendant 
 
1. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 419 (McKinney 1996). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/7
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sought to argue that the accused assailant was an owner of the 
corporation and not an employee. This would defeat the negligent hiring 
cause of action asserted by the plaintiff against the corporation, which 
was the only source of money for recovery of damages. Accordingly, the 
question here is whether a failure to expressly deny an allegation in the 
pleading constitutes a binding admission of fact, which prohibits the 
defendant from arguing to the jury that defendant was an owner, not an 
employee. 
 
II. History 
 
Admissions by a party have been recognized by both common law 
and the federal and state rules of evidence and have always been a highly 
debated topic. Roughly defined as a statement made by a party that can 
be used against that party at trial,
2
 an admission can be a highly 
prejudicial proclamation. Wigmore concedes that even though a party 
admission essentially has the same probative value as any other person’s 
assertion, its significance is greatly increased when offered against the 
party so as to invalidate any inconsistent statements made in pleadings or 
testimony.
3
 In fact, the weight of an admission is so great that it has often 
been held that a party may “plead themselves out of court.” After all, if a 
defendant admits to everything in the complaint, there is no triable issue. 
Accordingly, whether a party’s statement rises to the level of an 
admission, to the extent of removing the issue from trial, can be a highly 
contentious and imperative inquiry. 
In codifying the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Advisory 
Committee addressed party admissions as an express exclusion of 
hearsay.
4
 In order to qualify, the statement must be offered against the 
party and be the party’s own statement, which includes statements of an 
authorized agent, or be a statement which the party has adopted as true.
5
 
Examining the language of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) reveals that a couple 
of inferences may be made. The first comes from the introductory 
language of the rule which requires that “[t]he statement is offered 
 
2. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 254 (6th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter MCCORMICK]. 
3. See id. 
4. FED. R. EVID. 801; see also Liberto v. Liberto, 507 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (App. Div. 
1986); Fassett v. Fassett, 475 N.Y.S.2d 154, 155 (App. Div. 1984). 
5. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
3
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against an opposing party . . .”6 While this means that the statement must 
be contrary to a party’s position at trial, an admission, unlike a statement 
against interest, need not be against the party’s interest at the time it was 
made.
7
 
In addition, the statement must be (A) “made by the party in an 
individual or representative capacity”; (B) “one the party manifested that 
it adopted or believed to be true”; (C) “made by a person whom the party 
authorized to make a statement on the subject”; (D) “made by the party’s 
agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and 
while it existed”; or (E) “made by the party’s coconspirator during and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.”8 Essentially, the Advisory Committee 
required that an admission not only be against the party’s position but 
also that it either come directly from the party or the party acknowledge 
the statement and accept it as true. More importantly, since an admission 
is an exclusion to the hearsay rule, it is not limited to in-court testimony, 
thereby broadening the time frame and format in which an admission can 
be made.
9
 
In terms of the requirement that the statement come from the party, 
the language was expanded to include their authorized agent or 
representative.
10
 To determine if a representative’s statement meets the 
criteria of an admission, one must examine whether the statement was 
made in the scope of employment.
11
 As a guide to interpret what 
constitutes “scope of employment,” in an evidentiary setting, the 
Advisory Committee has stated that the only requirement is that the 
subject matter of the admission matches the subject matter of the 
employee’s job description.12 This issue arises often where an executor 
of a decedent’s estate makes statements to creditors as to the value of the 
estate.
13 
When it has been determined that such statements were not made 
 
6. Id. 
7. See Tamily v. Gen. Contracting Corp., 705 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 2000). 
8. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
9. See id. at 801(c). As hearsay is defined as, “a statement, other than one made by 
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted,” it follows that an exclusion from hearsay would not need to be 
made while testifying at the trial. Id. 
10. See id. 
11. See Tamily, 705 N.Y.S.2d 109; see also Mich. Nat’l Bank-Oakland v. Am. 
Centennial Ins. Co. (In re Liquidation of Union Indem. Ins. Co.), 674 N.E.2d. 313 (N.Y. 
1996). 
12. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
13. See, e.g., Commercial Trading Co. v. Tucker, 437 N.Y.S.2d 86 (App. Div. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/7
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by an executor in his capacity as such, the statements were not binding 
admissions against the estate.
14
 
Noticeably absent from the requirements of an admission under 
Federal Rule 801(d)(2) is the condition of trustworthiness. According to 
the Advisory Committee Notes, “[a]dmissions . . . are excluded from the 
category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is 
the result of the adversary system” and “[n]o guarantee of 
trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission.”15 This position is 
furthered by the theory that since the admission is made by the party 
against whom it is being used; there is no need for them to cross-examine 
themselves.
16
 Admissions can take virtually any form and tend to be 
categorized as either express or implied by conduct, and made by either 
the party directly or their representative.
17
 With respect to the pleadings, 
it has long been held that statements in both the complaint and answer 
may constitute an admission.
18 
However it is also true that an admission 
can take the form of statements in an original answer or complaint after 
amended versions were made,
19
 as well as through a bill of particulars,
20
 
affidavits,
21
 depositions,
22
 and the results of an investigation.
23
 
While direct testimony in court can obviously lead to an admission, 
testimony from a previous proceeding can as well. Such was the case in 
Columbia County Support Collection Unit ex rel. Carreras v. 
Interdonato, in which a New York court allowed the declarant’s previous 
testimony in a hearing before a Support Magistrate to be admitted in his 
subsequent Family Court proceeding.
24
 Even though no admission was 
made by the declarant in the Family Court, the voluntary and 
 
1981). 
14. See id. 
15. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 254; see also Knutson v. Sand, 725 N.Y.S.2d 350 
(App. Div. 2001). 
17. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 254. 
18. Id.; see also Coffin v. President of Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co., 32 N.E. 1076 
(N.Y. 1893); Kwiecinski v. Chung Hwang, 885 N.Y.S.2d 783 (App. Div. 2009); 
Moncreiffe Corp. v. Heung, 740 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 2002); Smith v. Limited, 655 
N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1997). 
19. Bagoni v. Friedlander, 610 N.Y.S.2d 511, 517-19 (App. Div. 1994). 
20. See Hill v. King Kullen Grocery Co., 581 N.Y.S.2d 378 (App. Div. 1992). 
21. See Baje Realty Corp. v. Cutler, 820 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (App. Div. 2006). 
22. See Ocampo v. Pagan, 892 N.Y.S.2d 452 (App. Div. 2009). 
23. See Mich. Nat’l Bank -Oakland v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. (In re Liquidation of 
Union Indem. Ins. Co.), 674 N.E.2d. 313 (N.Y. 1996). 
24. 858 N.Y.S.2d 801 (App. Div. 2008). 
5
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unequivocal nature of the admission to the Support Magistrate was 
sufficient in both formality and conclusiveness to be deemed binding in 
the Family Court proceeding.
25
 
Admissions through the conduct of a party, while not as prevalent, 
have also been accepted. Such admissions arise most commonly through 
silence. For example, silence as a response to an assertion, containing 
facts which the party would naturally be expected to deny has 
traditionally been received as an admission.
26
 Additionally, in connection 
with a responsive pleading, silence by means of failing to expressly deny 
a statement has the effect of an admission.
27
 
In a representative capacity, admissions commonly are introduced 
through the parties’ attorneys, whether in the form of their written 
briefs
28
 or as statements made in open court.
29
 Notably, since it has the 
same effect as an admission made directly by the party, an admission by 
a representative can be devastating when based on incorrect information. 
The question then becomes: when is an admission binding on the 
party so as to remove the issue from judgment? The answer may be 
found in the classification of the admission. 
 
III. Classification of Judicial Admissions 
 
A.  Formal Admissions 
 
When made in the context of a judicial proceeding, admissions in 
any form fall into one of two categories: formal, which are binding, and 
informal, which are rebuttable.
30
 Accordingly, the ability to differentiate 
the two can have a profound effect on a case. 
A formal judicial admission is a party’s own, deliberate, clear, and 
unequivocal statement about a material fact.
31
 Once made, the statement 
 
25. Id. 
26. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 262. 
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3018(a) (McKinney 1980). 
28. See Pok Rye Kim v. Mars Cup Co., 476 N.Y.S.2d 381 (App. Div. 1984). 
29. See 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 784 (2011). 
30. See Rahman v. Smith, No. 23495/03, 2005 WL 5118512, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 29, 2005). 
31. See id.; see also Markus May, A Primer on Judicial Admission, DCBA BRIEF: J. 
DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N, Feb.–Mar. 2005, at 12, available at 
http://www.dcbabrief.org/vol170205art1.html. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/7
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cannot be contradicted and is therefore conclusively bound to the party.
32
 
Once a statement is deemed to be a formal judicial admission, the 
statement is no longer evidence but rather a concession that completely 
withdraws the fact from contention.
33
 As a result, a formal judicial 
admission removes the need for the opposing party to further prove the 
admitted fact.
34
 
In order to constitute a formal judicial admission, the statement 
must be one of fact not opinion and must be contrary to an essential fact 
or defense asserted by the party giving the testimony as well as being 
deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.
35
 In addition, giving conclusive effect 
to the statement must not be inconsistent with public policy nor be 
detrimental to the opposing party’s theory of recovery.36 The 
determination of whether a statement reaches the standard of a formal 
judicial admission is a matter of law.
37
 
 
B. Informal Admissions 
 
Unlike the requirement that formal judicial admissions be 
unequivocal, informal judicial admissions are facts that are 
“incidentally” admitted during the judicial proceeding38 and are simply 
regarded as a piece of evidence that is not binding or conclusive on the 
trier of fact.
39
 Similar to any other form of evidence, informal admissions 
are subject to contradiction or explanation.
40
 Accordingly, the 
classification of an admission as either formal or informal has a 
tremendous impact on how the issue is treated and has the potential to 
determine the outcome of the case. 
 
 
 
 
32. See Rahman, 2005 WL 5118512, at *2. 
33. See id. 
34. See id. 
35. See Evidence, supra note 29, § 783; see also Raham, 2005 WL 5118512, at *2. 
36. See Evidence, supra note 29, § 783. 
37. See id. 
38. See Mich. Nat’l Bank-Oakland v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. (In re Liquidation of 
Union Indem. Ins. Co.), 674 N.E.2d. 313 (N.Y. 1996). 
39. See 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2590 (James H. Chadborn 
ed., 1981 & Supp. 1991); see also Mich. Nat’l Bank-Oakland, 674 N.E.2d at 317. 
40. See Mich. Nat’l Bank-Oakland, 674 N.E.2d at 317. 
7
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IV. Forms of Admissions 
 
In the Author’s experience, the two most common forms of 
admissions are statements made in pleadings and statements made in 
open court. These are formal admissions. Precedent was set by the 
United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Morehead,
41
 when after hearing 
testimony, it refused to allow the defendant to retract an admission made 
in its answer, stating, “[i]t would be subversive of all sound practice, and 
tend largely to defeat the ends of justice, if the court should refuse to 
accept a fact as settled, which is distinctly alleged in the bill, and 
admitted in the answer.”42 Likewise, in Zegarowicz v. Ripatti,43 the New 
York Supreme Court held that “[f]acts admitted by a party’s pleadings 
constitute formal judicial admissions.”44 
While statements in open court can be taken as formal judicial 
admissions, the classification hinges on the formality of the statement, 
not the location of the declarant. Accordingly, in order for a statement in 
court to be deemed a formal judicial admission it must strictly adhere to 
the requirements that it be a statement of fact against the party’s interest 
which is deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.
45
 
As far as statements in briefs or memoranda constituting a formal 
judicial admission, courts are hesitant to classify them as such, reserving 
the determination for cases in which a “statement totally exculpated” the 
other party.
46
 Again, guiding this decision are the same factors used in 
determining whether the admission was conclusive enough to constitute 
designation as a formal admission. Accordingly, courts adhere strictly to 
the requirement that the statement is one of material fact that is 
deliberately and unequivocally offered against the party’s position before 
 
41. 68 U.S. 155 (1863).  
42. Id. at 165. 
43. 911 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 2010). 
44. Id. at 72; see also Coffin v. President of Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co., 32 N.E. 
1076, 1076 (N.Y. 1893). But see Empire Purveyors, Inc. v. Weinberg, 885 N.Y.S.2d 905, 
905 (App. Div. 2009) (holding allegations in the pleadings made upon “information and 
belief” are not judicial admissions). 
45. See Rahman v. Smith, 835 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (App. Div. 2007). 
46. Pok Rye Kim v. Mars Cup Co., 476 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (App. Div. 1984) 
(deeming plaintiff counsel’s clear and unequivocal statements in opposing defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment binding and conclusive admissions). But see 1014 Fifth 
Ave. Realty Corp. v. Manhattan Realty Co., 490 N.E.2d 855, 856 (N.Y. 1986) (finding 
defendant counsel’s clear and unequivocal statements in brief not binding on the 
defendant). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/7
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formally binding the party to an admission made in their brief.
47
 
Additionally, a court may use admissions in a brief to determine that 
there are no genuine issues as to any material fact.
48
 
With this background, let us revisit our case studies. 
 
A. Case Study #1 
 
The issue is in this case is whether an admission of negligence made 
in an internal agency investigation and cited by counsel in a brief 
submitted to the court in support of a motion for summary judgment 
should be allowed at trial after the motion for summary judgment is 
denied. Furthermore, if the admission does carry over to trial, the issue 
becomes whether it is a formal or informal judicial admission. 
Using the criteria set forward in Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), to be 
considered an admission, the statement must be contrary to the party’s 
position at trial and be the party’s own statement.49 Based upon the facts 
of the case study, the results of the internal investigation and the 
statements made in counsel’s brief, which acknowledge negligence on 
the part of the agency, are contrary to the party’s position. Likewise, 
since the investigation was conducted by the Agency internally, the 
result could be considered its own statement. Furthermore, assuming, 
arguendo, that the investigator’s report of negligence is not considered a 
statement of the party, the inclusion of the result of the investigation in 
the attorney’s brief allows it to still be considered an admission made by 
a representative. 
The resolution of whether the admissions were made in a 
representative capacity depends upon whether the results of the 
investigation and counsel’s brief for summary judgment were within the 
scope of employment.
50
 As for the investigation, the New York Social 
Services Law specifically requires that an investigation be conducted and 
commenced within twenty-four hours of acceptance of a complaint.
51
 
Accordingly, the report finding that the Agency was negligent and that 
the negligence played a role in allowing the accident to occur satisfies 
 
47. See Rahman, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 405. 
48. See Kurten v. R.D. Werner Co., 527 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (App. Div. 1988). 
49. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
50. See Tamily v. Gen. Contracting Corp., 705 N.Y.S.2d 109, 112 (App. Div. 
2000). 
51. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(6)(a) (McKinney 2010). 
9
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the requirement that the subject matter of the admission match the 
subject matter of the job description.
52 
Therefore the findings of the 
Agency report should be deemed an admission made by a representative. 
Turning to the attorney’s brief filed with the summary judgment 
motion, the same scope of employment analysis is required. The 
attorney’s job description would be to represent the Agency in litigation 
and to present the best defense against liability. As such, the question is 
whether submitting the brief with a motion for summary judgment 
matches the job description. Clearly, filing a motion during litigation is 
part of an attorney’s job when representing a client. Likewise, the 
statements made in a brief are well within an attorney’s authority in 
connection with properly representing the client. The wisdom of the 
attorney’s strategy is not part of the analysis. Accordingly, the statements 
in the brief sufficiently match the attorney’s job description and should 
be deemed an admission made by a representative of a party. 
Finding that the statements in the brief constitute a judicial 
admission, the focus next turns to whether the admission is formal or 
informal. While admissions in the pleadings are more likely to be judged 
as formal, admissions in briefs require more analysis. 
Specifically, the first criteria of a judicial admission—that a 
statement be one of fact not opinion, contrary to an essential fact or 
defense asserted by the party giving the testimony, and be deliberate, 
clear, and unequivocal—requires closer examination.53 First, it is evident 
that the admission of negligence is not only contrary to an essential fact 
or defense asserted by the Agency but it was also deliberately made. The 
issue to examine, however, is whether the admission of negligence is an 
unequivocal statement of fact. In a similar determination, in Walter v. 
Wal-Mart,
54
 the court found that “because negligence consists of both 
law (whether a duty exists and what that duty is) and facts (whether the 
duty was breached), there was no [formal] admission of negligence.”55 
Furthermore, it can be argued that an admission of negligence is merely 
an opinion and not a statement based in fact and thus not unequivocal. 
Consequently, in this case, the Agency’s admission of negligence 
during its investigation and in its motion for summary judgment brief 
fails to reach the strict level of adherence to the requirements for a 
 
52. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note. 
53. See Rahman v. Smith, 835 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (App. Div. 2007). 
54. 748 A.2d 961 (Me. 2000). 
55. Id. at 967. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/7
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formal judicial admission. As a result, it is submitted that the statements 
most likely will be deemed informal admissions and therefore rebuttable 
through contrary evidence. 
 
B. Case Study #2 
 
The issue here is whether silence in a pleading binds a party as a 
judicial admission even though that admission is contrary to the weight 
of evidence as a matter of law. Specifically, since an admission made in 
a pleading is deemed a judicial admission,
56
 the issue is whether a 
“silent” admission in a pleading will be considered a formal admission 
binding on the party. 
The New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules (NY CPLR or the 
“Code”) make clear that an allegation in a responsive pleading not 
expressly denied is deemed admitted.
57
 As a result, the NY CPLR 
essentially requires a finding that failing to deny an allegation in an 
answer constitutes a non-rebuttable formal judicial admission. Such was 
the result in Fleischmann v. Stern,
58
 in which the court stated that “[t]he 
Code . . . gives to such omission the force of a formal admission and 
makes it conclusive as such upon the parties and upon the court.”59 In 
this case, the defendant produced sufficient evidence to establish that the 
assailant was a 50 percent stockholder of the corporation which owned 
the restaurant and, therefore, an owner not an employee of the restaurant. 
However, by failing to deny the allegation in his answer, the defendant is 
bound by that admission preventing further review even though this 
admission is against the weight of the evidence.    
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Admissions are a volatile part of the litigation process at every 
stage—from the pleadings to the closing statements. As minor 
admissions can have drastic results, it beseems the competent attorney to 
know the effect of everything introduced, either purposefully or 
inadvertently. Knowing what constitutes an admission and whether it is 
binding or rebuttable may assist in avoiding a pitfall or finding success. 
 
56. Zegarowicz v. Ripatti, 911 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (App. Div. 2010). 
57. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3018(a) (McKinney 1980). 
58. 90 N.Y. 110, 115 (1882). 
59. Id. at 115. 
11
